周波:一個單邊主義的美國是中國和歐洲的最佳粘合劑
guancha
編者按:澤連斯基和特朗普在白宮的不歡而散,標誌着歐洲尋求改善美歐關係的努力再次陷入困境,也成為推動歐洲追求戰略自主的催化劑。在這種情況下,中歐關係又會出現哪些變化?合作的契機是否已經到來?
日前,清華大學戰略與安全研究中心研究員周波在《南華早報》發文指出,隨着美國在國際事務中的角色逐漸調整,中國與歐洲的合作空間正在擴大。文章探討了中美歐三邊關係的未來走向,分析了中國在烏克蘭戰後重建和全球多邊秩序維護中的潛在作用。觀察者網和北京對話獲授權翻譯併發布中文版,內容如下。
【文/ 周波,翻譯/ 王凡非】
美國副總統萬斯在慕尼黑安全會議上的演講,對震驚的盟友而言無異於背後一刀。他完全迴避瞭如何結束烏克蘭戰爭的問題,反而指責歐洲各國都背叛了共同價值觀,忽視了對移民問題和言論自由的關切。
他的言論促使烏克蘭總統澤連斯基表示,“歐洲與美國幾十年來的舊關係正在結束”。

在特朗普第二任期的第一個月,他和他的幕僚們對美國形象的破壞比他所有前任加起來還要嚴重。
如果“美國治下的和平”正走向黃昏,那麼這也標誌着新時代的曙光初現。第61屆慕尼黑安全會議以“多極化”為主題,與以往幾屆會議中諸如“西方缺失”和“雙輸”等情緒化的主題不同,“多極化”指向了未來的發展趨勢。為呼應這一現實,近年來,越來越多來自亞洲和非洲的代表參加了這場以歐洲視角為中心的會議。
如果美國正從國際體系中退出,中國則正在以基於規則的秩序守護者的姿態進入。在慕尼黑,與萬斯形成鮮明對比的是,中國外交部長王毅呼籲建立一個平等有序的多極世界,並表示中國將成為這一體系中的確定性因素。
一個單邊主義的美國是中國和歐洲的最佳粘合劑。歐洲無法承受同時與中國進行貿易戰和與美國關係緊張的局面。在會議召開前,歐盟委員會主席馮德萊恩表示,歐盟與中國在貿易關係上仍有深化合作的空間,甚至有望“達成新的協議”。
改善與歐洲的緊張關係也符合中國的利益。中國不會通過歐洲的視角來看待俄羅斯,但中國也不需要為了俄羅斯而犧牲與歐洲的關係。
為了緩解歐洲對烏克蘭戰爭的焦慮,展示其公正性,中國可以支持烏克蘭參加直接關乎其未來的談判。一旦達成停火或停戰協議,中國還可以倡導包括歐盟在內的所有大國提供集體安全保障。
如果需要維和行動來穩定局勢,中國——聯合國安理會常任理事國中最大的部隊派遣國——可以牽頭與“全球南方”國家一起維和。俄羅斯肯定會認為北約在烏克蘭的任何維和人員都是披着羊皮的狼。鑑於中國“基建狂魔”的實力,中國完全可以為烏克蘭的戰後重建提供有力支持。
最重要的是,中國和歐盟可以攜手在多邊體系中維護基於規則的秩序。畢竟,中國已經加入了幾乎所有現有的政府間組織和國際公約。挑戰在於布魯塞爾方面。中國被歐盟官方同時描述為合作伙伴、經濟競爭者和系統性對手。
這種大雜燴式的描述更多地反映了歐洲對中國的困惑,而非中國究竟是什麼。多虧了特朗普,美國現在應該比中國更像一個經濟競爭者和系統性對手。
有趣的是,到目前為止,特朗普對中國表現出了令人驚訝的熱情。這體現在他邀請中國國家主席出席他的就職典禮,並呼籲中國幫助結束烏克蘭戰爭。
特朗普關於中國和華盛頓可以“共同解決世界上所有問題”的聲明,幾乎讓人想起美國前總統奧巴馬對“兩國集團”提議的擁抱。他對中國徵收的10%關税增幅低於對加拿大和墨西哥延遲徵收的25%關税。

墨西哥工廠
這是兩國決鬥前的鞠躬嗎?無論如何,特朗普如今應該意識到,他那標誌般的不可預測性在面對一個勢均力敵的對手時幾乎毫無用處。他對所有中國商品加徵10%關税的舉措,迅速招致了中國對部分美國進口產品的對等反制。當他將DeepSeek稱為“美國工業的警鐘”時,他無疑清楚,中國在某些高科技領域已超越美國。
特朗普的第二任期能為中美關係帶來更多穩定嗎?儘管這位商人轉型的總統以交易著稱,但他在第一任期留下的遺產卻屬於意識形態, 即兩黨一致的強硬對華共識。這或許並非他的本意,但蓬佩奧、納瓦羅和萊特希澤等鷹派人物綁架了對華政策。即便是前總統拜登也未能擺脱其束縛。
這一次,共和黨在美國國會中佔據多數席位,加上特朗普對其團隊的絕對掌控,若他有意,他完全有能力重塑自己的政治遺產。萬斯演講中最引人注目的並非他所言,而是他所未言——除了輕描淡寫地提到俄羅斯和中國並非主要威脅,以及歐洲的最大威脅源於內部之外,他幾乎避而不談這兩個國家。正可謂此時無聲勝有聲。
或許這位總司令希望將所有關鍵問題的王炸牢牢掌握在自己手中?時間將證明這種猜測是否只是空想。
【以下為英文原文】
US Vice-President J.D. Vance’s speech at the recently concluded Munich Security Conference was an unexpected stab in the back for America’s appalled allies. Without any talk on how to end the war in Ukraine, he accused European capitals of betraying their values and ignoring concerns over immigration and free speech.
His comments prompted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to say that “decades of the old relationship between Europe and America are ending”.
In the first month of his second term in office, Trump and his lieutenants have done more damage to America’s image than all his predecessors combined.
If this is the sunset of Pax Americana, it is also the dawn of a new era. The theme of the 61st Munich Security Conference was “multipolarisation”. Compared with the themes of past conferences such as “Westlessness” and “Lose-Lose”, which are expressions of emotions, multipolariasation points to the direction of the future. To reflect this reality, more Asian and African delegates have taken part in this Eurocentric conference in recent years.
If the US withdraws from the international system, China is moving in like a guardian of the rules-based order. In Munich, as a sharp contrast to Vance, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for an equal and orderly multipolar world, saying China would be a factor of certainty in this system.
A unilateral America is the best glue for China and Europe to stick together. Europe can’t afford to have a trade war with China and tension with the United States at the same time. Before the conference, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that there was room to strengthen trade relations and even “find agreements” with Beijing.
It is also in China’s interests to improve strained relations with Europe. China won’t view Russia through the prism of Europe, yet China does not need to sacrifice its relationship with Europe for Russia, either.
To alleviate Europe’s anxiety about the war in Ukraine, Beijing could best show its impartiality by supporting Kyiv’s inclusion in negotiations that have a direct bearing on its future. China can also champion a collective security guarantee by all major powers, including the European Union, once a ceasefire or armistice is reached.
If peacekeeping is needed to stabilise the situation, China – the largest troop-contributing country among UN Security Council permanent members – can lead in sending troops from the Global South. Russia would surely see any peacekeepers from Nato in Ukraine as wolves in sheep’s clothing. Given that China’s infrastructure-building efforts are second to none, Beijing can also help Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction.
Most importantly, China and the EU can join hands in safeguarding the rules-based order in a multilateral system. After all, Beijing has joined almost all existing intergovernmental organisations and international conventions. The challenge is for Brussels. China is officially described as a partner for cooperation, an economic competitor and a systemic rival at the same time.
Such a hodgepodge description tells more about Europe’s confusion about China than what China actually is. Thanks to Trump, the US should now look more like an economic competitor and a systemic rival than China does.
It is intriguing how Trump, so far, has shown a surprising degree of cordiality towards Beijing. This is seen in his invitation to President Xi Jinping to attend his inauguration and his call for China to help end the war in Ukraine.
His statement that Beijing and Washington could work together “to solve all of the problems of the world” is almost a reminder of former US president Barack Obama’s embrace of the Group of Two proposal. His 10 per cent tariff hike on China is lower than the delayed 25 per cent tariffs on Canada and Mexico.
Is this bowing before a duel? Regardless, Trump should know by now that his signature unpredictability is of little use when dealing with a peer competitor. His 10 per cent tariff on all Chinese products was met with Chinese retaliatory tariffs on select American imports. He most certainly knows China’s advances in some hi-tech areas have already surpassed America’s, as evidenced by his description of DeepSeek as “a wake-up call for [US] industries”.
Could China-US relations become less volatile in Trump’s second term? Although this businessman-turned-president is transactional, the legacy he left after his first term is ideological – a domestically bipartisan agreement on confronting China. This may not be what he wanted but China hawks like Mike Pompeo, Peter Navarro and Robert Lighthizer hijacked American policy towards China. Even former US president Joe Biden could not walk out of this trap.
This time, with a majority of Republicans in the US Congress and absolute power over his team, Trump is best positioned to change his own legacy if he wants to. The most interesting thing about Vance’s speech is what he didn’t say – he barely mentioned Russia or China except to say they are not primary threats and that Europe’s biggest threats come from within. Such silence is too loud to ignore.
Perhaps the commander-in-chief wants to keep all the trump cards on top issues to himself? Time will tell if such speculation is merely a hallucination.

本文系觀察者網獨家稿件,文章內容純屬作者個人觀點,不代表平台觀點,未經授權,不得轉載,否則將追究法律責任。關注觀察者網微信guanchacn,每日閲讀趣味文章。