周波：中美若爆發台海衝突，誰會選邊站？

編者按：中美若在台海開戰，日本、澳大利亞真會出兵相助嗎？菲律賓會不會趁機在南海擴張？韓國、印度又將如何權衡自身利益？面對美國的催促，這些盟友為何仍猶豫不決？

7月26日，清華大學戰略與安全研究中心研究員周波在《南華早報》發文指出，台海一旦爆發中美衝突，真正願意並能夠深度介入的第三方國家其實寥寥。當盟友對介入代價愈發敏感、華盛頓自身立場又未明朗時，美國所設想的“聯合陣線”恐將難現。

北京對話和觀察者網翻譯發佈如下。

【文/觀察者網專欄作者 周波，翻譯/劉松瑀】

外界一直猜測，一旦中美因台海爆發衝突，哪些第三方國家會捲入其中。6月，《經濟學人》發表了一篇專門探討這一問題的文章。近日，《金融時報》報道稱，美國正在向日本和澳大利亞施壓，就台海突發事態中的具體介入角色作出明確表態。

看起來，站在中國一邊的國家恐怕寥寥無幾。中國唯一的條約盟友是朝鮮。1961 年的《中朝友好合作互助條約》規定，任何一方若遭無端攻擊，雙方須採取“一切必要措施”共同應對。雖然朝鮮已向烏克蘭前線派兵援俄，理論上未來也可能出兵助華，而且相比俄羅斯，中國對正遭受國際制裁的朝鮮政權顯然更為關鍵，但目前中朝關係的温度似乎不及俄朝之間熱絡。

巴基斯坦被稱作中國的“鐵哥們”。鑑於印巴關係已幾乎無法挽回，若事態發展到最糟糕的地步，中國要求巴基斯坦出手牽制印度，巴基斯坦或許會認真考慮照做。然而，若要巴基斯坦為了協助中國而與美國為敵，則幾乎不可能——畢竟美國仍是巴基斯坦的主要援助國。

中國最倚重的戰略伙伴無疑是俄羅斯，兩國的親密關係體現在定期舉行的海空聯合演習中。但如果中國在俄烏衝突中沒有向俄羅斯提供軍事援助，俄羅斯又為何要捲入台海衝突呢？想必俄羅斯會繼續向中國出售石油和天然氣，就像中國仍在向俄羅斯出售非軍事物資一樣，但大概也就僅限於此了。

在美國一方，願意在與中國衝突時提供軍事支援的國家也屈指可數，且多半也不會心甘情願。《經濟學人》的文章似乎也持此觀點，文中引用了新美國安全中心（CNAS）的一份最新報告，只是該報告的分析並不能完全令人信服。

報告的第一條結論顯而易見：如果美國按兵不動，其盟友也會袖手旁觀。第二條結論是，一旦美國介入，受其影響最大的盟友將是日本和菲律賓。日本的參與程度大概率僅限潛艇巡邏或導彈打擊；菲律賓則會更加謹慎，但若解放軍陷入僵局，它可能趁機在南海推進其主權聲索。

我同意日本和菲律賓會是受影響最大的國家，因為它們都處於靠近中國海岸的第一島鏈上。不過，除非日本自身先遭到中國攻擊，否則它最多隻會為美國提供後勤支援，不至於對中國發動導彈攻擊。

至於説菲律賓會趁機在南海“撈地盤”，更是無稽之談。倘若如此，軍力遠勝菲律賓的越南和馬來西亞為何不出手也撈地盤？一旦中美開戰，所有東南亞國家面臨的挑戰都將是如何避免這場衝突波及整個地區。若衝突升級為全面戰爭，南海那些有爭議的島嶼恐怕都將不復存在。

新美國安全中心的報告説得沒錯：另一批與美國關係密切的盟友——韓國、澳大利亞和印度——受到的衝擊會相對有限，但美方大概率仍會施壓，要求它們出力。其中，韓國的首要關切始終是朝鮮半島的局勢。

澳大利亞能為美國提供的最大支持，莫過於允許美國使用其軍事基地對中國的艦船和飛機發動攻擊。澳大利亞官員擔心，若在任何衝突中保持中立，“奧庫斯”潛艇項目或將告吹，這種擔憂可以理解，但對澳大利亞而言，避免與本國最大的貿易伙伴發生戰爭，難道不比購買幾艘潛艇更重要嗎？

當地時間2025年7月11日，澳大利亞布里斯班，美國海軍“美利堅”號兩棲攻擊艦停靠在港口。

中國國內有人擔心，一旦台海開戰，印度會趁機在實控線附近蠶食更多領土。但在我看來，這種情況不會發生。我贊同新美國安全中心報告的判斷：印度的首要任務將是全力守住與中國的陸上邊界。

總而言之，幾乎沒有國家願意捲入中美之間的衝突。洛伊研究所的分析指出，全球已有119個國家——佔聯合國成員總數的62%——選擇接受北京提出的主權表述，承認中國對台灣擁有主權；其中89%支持中國完成統一，但並未明確要求這一過程必須和平進行。

美國想逼盟友選邊站隊，恐怕比它預想的要難，尤其當它自己的介入理由前所未有地站不住腳時。對華鷹派人物埃爾布里奇·科爾比去年9月在《華爾街日報》撰文直言，“台灣對美國而言，並非生死攸關。”

如果現任美國國防部負責政策事務的副部長科爾比的立場都能“明顯軟化”，如參議員羅傑·威克在其提名聽證會上所説的那樣，這就透露出風向正在變化。美國總統特朗普一向不吝表達個人觀點，卻在台灣問題上出奇的沉默——他是在靜待時機、準備“交易”嗎？這份沉默，實在是震耳欲聾！

英文原文：

There has been much speculation as to which third parties might get involved if war broke out between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait. In June, The Economist published an article on this very question. More recently, the Financial Times reported that the US had been putting pressure on Japan and Australia to clarify what role they would play in such a situation.

It appears that there would be few countries on China’s side. China’s only treaty ally is North Korea. A 1961 treaty obliges the two sides to take “all necessary measures” to oppose any country or coalition of countries that attack either nation unprovoked. Although North Korea sending soldiers to fight for Russia in Ukraine could raise the same prospect one day, and Beijing certainly matters much more than Moscow to the survival of a country under extensive international sanctions, currently China’s ties with North Korea appear less warm than those between Russia and North Korea.

Pakistan has been described as an “iron brother” of China. Given its almost unsalvageable relationship with India, Pakistan might seriously consider following through if China asked it to help take on India in a worst-case scenario. However, Islamabad joining a war to assist China against the US – which is a major provider of aid to Pakistan – is highly unlikely.

China’s most useful strategic partner is unquestionably Russia. Their closeness is reflected in their regular air and sea exercises. But why would Russia choose to get involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait if China has not provided Russia with military assistance in the Ukraine war? Presumably Russia would continue to sell China oil and gas, just like China is still selling Russia non-military items, but that’s probably all.

On the American side, not more than a handful of countries would provide military assistance to the US in a conflict with China, and each would do so half-heartedly at best. The Economist article seems to share this view as it quotes a recent paper from the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), though the paper’s analysis is not entirely convincing.

Its first conclusion is obvious: if the US stays out of the war, its allies will, too. The second is that if the US does step in, its most affected allies would be Japan and the Philippines. Japan’s participation would be unlikely to go much further than submarine patrols or missile strikes. The Philippines would be more cautious, the CNAS paper said, but if Chinese forces were bogged down, it might be tempted to advance its claims in the South China Sea.

I agree that Japan and the Philippines would be the countries most affected in that they are both on the first chain of islands close to the Chinese coast. However, I doubt Japan would go beyond providing the US with logistical support for missile attacks on China unless it is attacked by China first.

Meanwhile, it is absurd to suggest the Philippines would be tempted to grab territory in the South China Sea. If that is the case, why wouldn’t Vietnam and Malaysia – which have stronger militaries than the Philippines – do likewise? In the event of China and the US going to war, the challenge for all Southeast Asian countries would be avoiding a conflict that engulfs the entire region. If the conflict spills over into an all-out war, the disputed islands in the South China Sea might not even exist any more.

The CNAS paper is right to say a second group of close US allies and partners – South Korea, Australia and India – would be more insulated, though Washington would likely pressure them to help. South Korea’s primary concern is the Korean peninsula.

The best support Australia could provide the US would be to allow the use of Australian bases to launch attacks on Chinese ships and aircraft. Australian officials worrying that the Aukus submarine deal could be in jeopardy if Australia stays out of any conflict is understandable, but isn’t avoiding war with the country’s largest trading partner more significant to Canberra than buying a few submarines?

Some in China would argue that India might use a US-China conflict in the Taiwan Strait to claim more territory along the Line of Actual Control, but I doubt that would happen. I agree with the CNAS authors that India would focus on defending its land border with China.

In conclusion, few countries would wish to become involved in a conflict between China and the US. According to Lowy Institute analysis, 119 countries – 62 per cent of UN member states – have endorsed Beijing’s preferred wording, accepting its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Of them, 89 per cent support Beijing’s reunification efforts, without specifying that these efforts should be peaceful.

Washington will find it harder than it thinks to pressure its allies to pick sides, especially when its own involvement looks more questionable than ever. Elbridge Colby, a long-time China hawk, wrote in The Wall Street Journal last September that Taiwan “isn’t itself of existential importance to America”.

If the views of Colby, now US undersecretary of defence for policy, could have “softened considerably”, as Senator Roger Wicker said during his confirmation hearing, it gives a clue as to where things are moving. US President Donald Trump rarely misses a chance to express an opinion, but so far he has not said much on the Taiwan issue. Is he keeping quiet while waiting for a chance to make a deal? His silence could not be louder.

本文系觀察者網獨家稿件，文章內容純屬作者個人觀點，不代表平台觀點，未經授權，不得轉載，否則將追究法律責任。關注觀察者網微信guanchacn，每日閲讀趣味文章。