胡鞍鋼：民主的中國集體領導體制
【美國《赫芬頓郵報》新聞評論網站《世界郵報》2014年5月12日刊登觀察者網供稿，清華大學國情研究院院長鬍鞍鋼教授文章“Is China More Democratic Than The U.S.?”。】
《赫芬頓郵報》刊發胡鞍鋼文章
二十多年前，隨着冷戰的鐵幕落入歷史，許多非西方國家選擇以西方民主制度取代自身原有的政治體制。這些國家多數囫圇吞棗地移植了美國的總統制，而未將這種政治“舶來品”真正融入本國的政治文化。彼時，民主世界的新成員們皆視民主為包治百病的“萬靈丹”，欲以此一掃蘇聯體製造成的種種痼疾；並與西方一起闊步走向歷史的終結。然而，僅僅二十餘年後，這些新興民主國家幾乎無一例外——甚至包括西方自身——都面臨着深刻的結構性困境。
前幾年的全球金融危機使本就飽受政治僵局、社會割裂、經濟停滯等一系列難題困擾的西方民主國家雪上加霜，前景堪憂。中國則在這段時間裏快速趕超西方，成為世界第二大經濟體，其經濟總量預計將在十年內超過美國。
1978年時，中國的人均收入還不足非洲國家平均水平的三分之一。她究竟是如何在不“改旗易幟”的前提下，在消除貧困、提升人民生活水平等方面取得舉世矚目成就的呢？
回答這個令西方費解的問題，關鍵在於中國社會的穩定。社會穩定，是中國以史為鑑得出的重要經驗，也是中國當前階段取得巨大成績的關鍵。要創造有利於經濟增長的宏觀環境，就必須保證社會的秩序和穩定，這一切必須以成熟的政治制度作為基礎。
要認真研究中國，就不能把中國的體制與東亞威權主義體制混為一談；否則得出的結論就將流於概念化、簡單化。誠然，中國的改革開放與其他東亞經濟體更早期的改革不無相似之處；但它們的性質不盡相同。東亞國家和台灣地區的威權主義政府主導了產業升級，使國民經濟的主要增長部門由農業向工業轉移。
務實的中國模式
除了超大規模的人口和豐富的自然資源外，中國還得益於一套務實的政治體制。正是這套體制鼓勵中國積極學習借鑑世界各國的先進生產實踐經驗，使中國得以超越東亞模式。
1980年，鄧小平對中國的社會主義現代化建設提出了三個要求：中國要在經濟上趕上發達的資本主義國家（實際上是指美國）；在政治上創造比資本主義國家（實際上還是主要指美國）的民主更高更切實的民主；並且造就比這些國家更多更優秀的人才。這三個要求也是判斷一個發展中國家的政治制度，特別是中國的社會主義體制好不好、完善不完善的標準。
研究中國的政治體制，一定要避免陷入“專制-民主”這種陳舊的對比範式。一旦政治學者把所謂“威權體制”這張狗皮膏藥貼到新一屆中國領導人身上，就必將忽視中國政治體制的獨到之處。西方許多人還錯誤地以為中國是個極權主義國家，但事實上，從權力和責任分配角度來説，中國的集體領導體制比被西方民主政治奉為圭臬的立法、行政、司法“三權分立”更加精密。早在民國時期，孫中山就結合國情，在西方各國實行的“三權分立”基礎上提出了“五權分立”；其後，中國共產黨進一步創新，組建起由多個機構構成的“超級國家機構”，這種情況只有歐盟有——歐盟理事會、歐盟委員會、歐洲議會、歐洲央行等大型組織共同分擔各領域的權利和責任。
為什麼中國的常委集體領導制要優於西方國家政治制度的“一黨控制”、“兩黨分治”、“三權分立”、“總統（個人負責）制”？我在新書《中國集體領導體制》中，對這個問題進行了梳理和回答。中國走上集體領導制的道路，不是偶然的，也不是某個領導人憑空想出來的，而是新中國在吸取歷史經驗教訓的基礎上，經過長期的制度創新、制度學習、制度變遷的“試錯”過程，摸索出來的。在書中，我將中國特色的集體領導制的運行機制概括為五大機制：集體分工協作機制、集體交接班機制、集體學習機制、集體調研機制和集體決策機制。
集體分工協作機制
中國有句古諺，叫做“三個臭皮匠，賽過諸葛亮”，這很準確地描述出中國這個文明古國對集體智慧的重視程度。實際上，遵義會議後不久，在黨的第一代領導集體剛剛開始形成時，黨中央常委的分工協作機制即以開始實際運作，也就是説，“大權集中、小權分散”已初具雛形。1945年，中共中央書記處“五大書記”便根據各自領導經驗和才幹，分別負責軍事指揮、土地改革、情報聯絡、黨組建設、羣團統戰等各項工作。
今天，國內外局勢更加千頭萬緒，各方面綜合治理更加需要中央領導集體堅持鞏固分工協作的基本原則和運行機制。中國領導集體的溝通、協商、協作體現在不同層面上：首先，各常委個人之間存在協作關係，在自身主要負責領域之外，還需協助其他常委工作；其次，各常委所代表的決策機構之間互相協作、共享信息，各機構黨組定期就重大戰略問題向中央政治局常委會提交報告，研究重大決策；第三，各機構下屬的內部智庫相互競爭、相互合作，為形成全面、綜合的戰略決策信息、知識和建議的黨中央“大腦”提供了基礎。
西方政治學語境中的三權分立雖有效地限制了權力的濫用，但同時也造成了政治僵局，束縛領導人使其難以施展手腳進行迫切的根本性改革，用通俗的話來講，就是幹不了壞事，也幹不了好事。反觀中國，最高領導層及其管轄的各機構共同構成了一個團結統一的體系，各機構不但有互相監督的職能，更能夠促成負責任的治理，鼓勵領導人多幹實事、好事。
集體交接班機制
西方長期以“缺乏透明度”為由，非議中國的領導集體交接班機制，然而正是這套被西方誤讀的機制，確保了黨和國家領導權力的平穩交接。在中國領導人數次新老交替中，中共完成了從個人選擇個人接班人到集體選擇集體接班人的轉變，形成了黨中央集體選擇、集體考察、集體交接班的機制。
中西領導人之間一項重要的區別是，中國提拔領導人看的是才幹和政績，西方民主國家領導人晉升靠的是選舉。在奉行選舉民主的國家裏，不同政黨代表着不同社會利益集團的部分利益，只要在週期性選戰中擊敗政敵，該政黨就直接獲得了執政的正當性。中國共產黨不是西方政治學意義上的普通政黨，它代表着廣大中國人民的根本利益。統治績效是中共執政合法性的重要來源，要中國人民單憑選舉接受一個缺乏能力和行政經驗的領袖——諸如小布什或奧巴馬——是很困難的。
大批共產黨的中層幹部需要跨越兩個重要的政治台階，才能成為中央領導集體成員。第一個台階是擔任黨的省區市委書記，在治理國家前先接受省的鍛鍊和考驗。從某種意義上説，擔任省區市黨委書記就進入了學習國家治理之道最好的學校。在經歷了長期、激烈的競爭；積累了處理各地區、各部門難題的經驗；熟練把握形勢，掌握各種資源信息之後，有為的幹部才能在嚴格的考驗中脱穎而出。只有這樣的領導人，才有能力管理好中國這個世界頭號人口大國。説直接一點，這就是個政治學習過程，學好了的可以上去，沒學好的基本就退休了。以中央政法委書記孟建柱為例，他曾經擔任過上海川沙、嘉定縣委書記、上海市副市長、市委副書記，後來調到江西省擔任省委書記。江西省是個大省，有4500萬人口，經濟總量相當於一箇中等國家。中央的高層幹部幾乎都要經過這樣的歷練，才能坐到現在這個位子上。
成為中央委員之後，高層幹部們還需邁上第二個台階才能真正成為中國最高權力的接班人。這個台階的主要鍛鍊崗位是中央政治局委員和候補委員、中央書記處書記和候補書記，在“集體交接班”過渡期中，他們需要擔任黨的領導集體成員，即中央政治局常委的主要助手。在這個“實習期”和“預備期”中，他們全面接受治黨治國理政之道之術的“強化訓練”，為他們將來集體結伴作各種政治準備。
既然中國共產黨代表着廣大中國人民的根本利益，它就承擔着確保國家昌盛、民族富強的至高責任。正因為此，中國最高領導權力的交接必須非常謹慎。這樣，集體交接班機制不但有效地避免了個人獨裁，而且更重要的是，它通過嚴格的政治考察，防止戈爾巴喬夫式的人物掌權，導致中國目前取得的偉大成就付諸東流。
集體學習機制
中國共產黨是典型的學習型政黨，中國曆任領導人都帶頭學習、提倡學習，逐漸形成了學習的優良傳統。2003年，中共十六屆二中全會決定正式建立中央政治局集體學習制度。通過集體學習，黨中央領導核心與決策諮詢、政策評估部門展開積極互動，彙總多元背景信息，羣策羣智完成信息分享與綜合判斷，不斷地提高自身的執政能力、積極學習創新、不斷與時俱進。
在這一機制下，中央政治局定期邀請國家智庫成員，向全體常委做專題授課，並召開各類講座、研討會。政治局常委則圍繞國民經濟與社會發展重要領域、重大問題，向頂尖專家學者徵詢意見和建議。正是通過這種建設性交流，中央領導集體得以在各決策諮詢部門的幫助下，恰當地處理重大棘手問題。
我作為清華大學的教授，除了要給學生上課外，還要給在職幹部上課，專講中國國情與改革問題。過去只有中央黨校、國家行政學院設立此類課程，後來拓展到清華大學、北京大學、北京師範大學、中國人民大學和國防大學等各類高校。今天，領導幹部集體學習已經是一個制度化高、參與度廣的機制了。
實際上，幹部學習遠不止於書本和教室：各級黨委、政府、國企、事業單位，都是培養優秀幹部的大課堂。中央政治局常委的平均工齡為43.6年，黨齡為38.9年。習近平1953年生，1969年參加工作，1974年入黨——也就是説，他在公共事務、組織管理方面已積累了四十餘年的學習經驗。
集體調研機制
“沒有調查，就沒有發言權。”毛澤東早在1930年便提出了這個著名論斷。
任何公共政策要獲得良好效果，其決策就應建立在大量相關信息的基礎之上。中國幅員遼闊、人口眾多，治理起來千頭萬緒，一個人再有智慧、能力，也不可能瞭解那麼多信息。在個人領導體制下，這種信息不對稱性嚴重影響了政府決策的有效性；在中國的集體領導體制下，政治局常委分管不同機構，下屬多個研究室、委員會，這些內部智庫負責為領導集體蒐集各種信息。與此同時，中央領導人們也非常注重深入基層，着眼於不同側重點廣泛調查，充分採集第一手信息，便於接下去全面彙總、集體討論、達成共識、做出決策。集體調研不但可以促進地方貫徹落實黨中央的政策方針，也是應對突發性公共事件或重大自然災害的積極手段。
中國曾是一個內部差異巨大的出口導向型經濟體，易受國際經濟環境震盪的影響。制定中國的宏觀經濟政策，關乎國計民生，尤須審慎。2008年金融危機爆發時，許多國家的政府要麼措手不及，要麼束手無策，而中共第十七屆政治局常委第一時間展開了實地考察，通過調研很快形成共識，最終非常及時地推出了四萬億經濟刺激計劃。這種高度制度化的集體調研、集體決策機制，未雨綢繆，使中國能夠從容應對外部挑戰。
在今年3月新版的《民主決策：中國集體領導體制》一書中，我添加了一個附錄：《踏遍青山，問計於民》。根據不完全統計，習近平總書記自上任起至2013年12月末的400余天時間裏，共用了39天，進行了14次國內考察調研，遍及全國1/3多的省、自治區、直轄市及七大軍區。在十八屆三中全會召開之前，農村土地所有權、承包權、經營權等問題一直存在爭議。為此，習近平特意拜訪了湖北的農户，親自詢問農民的真實想法。他也會聽彙報，聽專家意見，但領導人不能僅有二手材料，通過調研獲取第一手材料，是幫助領導人全面瞭解情況、綜合判斷的好方法。
集體決策機制
共和國六十餘年來的歷史實踐，讓黨中央清楚地認識到：戰略決策的成功是最大的成功，戰略決策的失敗是最大的失敗。1958年以後，毛澤東在重大決策中的個人作用越來越凸顯，逐漸凌駕於黨中央之上，削弱了集體領導原則和民主集中制，黨的民主生活和正規制度遭到嚴重破壞，導致中國經歷了一場混亂的浩劫——如果中國當時能夠保持革命時期和建國初期確立下來的政治原則，堅持集體領導不向個人領導退化，發生在毛澤東晚年的悲劇在較大程度上是可以避免的。
領導集體內部的權力不對稱性，往往會妨礙其做出正確的決策。毛澤東時代晚期，中國政治權力結構逐漸失衡，這和他後來犯的錯誤密切相關；後來鄧小平重建黨中央集體決策機制，恢復結構平衡，為集體決策科學化、民主化和制度化打下了堅實的基礎。
中共的集體決策，本着“集體領導、民主集中、個別醖釀、會議決定”的民主集中制原則。西方在看待民主集中制時，總難免戴着有色眼鏡，但實際上，信息互換、追求共識等民主程序，正是中國集體決策機制的不可或缺的內容和形式。
有8500萬黨員的中國共產黨，是世界最大的、最強有力的組織，它在吸取歷史經驗的基礎上，開闢了核心性制度創新的道路。中國是一個區域差異明顯、社會利益多元的文明型國家，只有接受集體領導的中國共產黨才能全面代表中國人民的根本利益；只有這樣才能確保各級政府部門良好的分工協作；也只有這樣，各種社會力量才能凝聚到一起，不斷推動中國向着實現民族復興的偉大目標前進。
（觀察者網楊晗軼/譯。翻頁請看英文原文）
Is China More Democratic Than The U.S.?
Hu Angang is director of the Center for China Studies, a joint research center of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and Tsinghua University. This article is distributed by the Guancha Syndicate and its Chinese original was published in Guancha.cn.
SHANGHAI -- After the iron curtain had come down more than two decades ago, many non-western countries got rid of their old political systems and replaced them with Western democracy. Instead of assimilating such foreign systems with their own political cultures, many simply transplanted the presidential system of the United States to their own soil. Back then, it was widely believed that democracy was the “panacea” that would cure all Soviet dysfunctions. And the new democracies would march with the West on a convergent path to the end of history. However, in merely 20 odd years, almost without exception, these new democracies -- and to some extent the West itself -- have all run into deep structural predicament.
Political stalemate, social malaise, economic stagnation, worsened by the latest global financial crisis, outline a depressing picture of the democratic West. Meanwhile, China has leapfrogged the West to become the world’s second largest economy, and it is projected to overtake the U.S within the next decade.
How could China, a country that, in as late as 1978, was three times poorer than an average African nation in terms of income per capita, succeed in the Herculean task of poverty reduction and general improvement of living standard for its people, without converting its political institutions to the western orthodox?
This remains a perplexing case to many in the West. The answer lies in China’s social stability. This is a lesson the Chinese learned it the hard way throughout their history. It is also the single most important factor behind the country’s enormous success. A growth-enabling macroeconomic environment is safeguarded by well-maintained social order and stability; which are in turn made possible by mature political institutions.
If one wants to study China seriously, then one can’t just group China among other East Asian authoritarian regimes without any differentiation. Otherwise, it would be a grossly vague and ineffective simplification. While it is true that, to a limited extent, China’s reform resembles earlier reforms in other East Asian economies, they are not the same. In Taiwan and other East Asian countries, authoritarian governments oversaw industrial upgrading; they incentivized and led the transition away from primary to secondary industry as the growth-generating sector.
PRAGMATIC INSTITUTIONS
However, in the case of China, in addition to the sheer size of its population and the abundance of its natural resources, the socialist government established pragmatic institutions that encourage learning best practices from around the world. This enabled China to go beyond the East Asian Model.
In 1980, Deng Xiaoping proposed three criteria for judging whether the government of any developing country, particularly China, is legitimate and qualified to govern or not: firstly, can its economic governance put the country on the right track to catch up with the most advanced capitalist economy, namely the U.S.; secondly, can its political governance produce more genuine democracy than the American institutions; and lastly, does the government play well its enabling and facilitative role in grooming ever more talents for the colossal task of modernization?
If one were to follow the antiquated paradigm of autocracy versus democracy and apply such labels to all five generations of Chinese leaders, one would invariably overlook some very crucial facts that are unique features of China’s political system. Many in the West still mistake China for a Stalinist totalitarian state. But the truth is, arguably, the distribution of power and accountability within China’s “Collective Presidency” is more sophisticated than the separation of power between legislative, executive and judiciary branches in the western political context. As early as in the Republican Period, Sun Yat-sen went beyond the West in terms of checks and balances within political institutions, by envisioning the separation of five powers. And the Communist Party of China (CPC) took an innovative step even further by first dividing and then reintegrating power into “super-institutions”, a practice vaguely resembled by the European Union, where the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank, and other organizations jointly share power on different fronts.
In a humble effort to illustrate the case of China, I have put together historical experience and lessons since the naissance of the People’s Republic in my recent book Democratic Decision-making: China’s Collective Presidency (China Renmin University Press, March 2014). I want to explain why the collective leadership of seven to nine Politburo Standing Committee members is superior to the system of singular presidency. China did not just stumble upon collective presidency by accident, nor did it happen by random invention. China has gone through laborious processes of innovation, trials and errors, rectification, and institutionalization to become what it is today. I have identified in the book the five major mechanisms of China’s collective presidency: collective collaboration, collective power transition, collective self-improvement, collective research, and collective decision-making.
COLLECTIVE COLLABORATION
“The collective wisdom of the masses humbles any individual prodigy”-- this time-tested Chinese proverb aptly reflects how this ancient civilization traditionally values collectivism. In fact, shortly after the Long March of 1938, the founding fathers of the People’s Republic had seen clearly the need for division of responsibilities. In other words, the decentralization of the centralized power. Important issues relating to military, land reform, intelligence, party organization, mobilization and publicity were divided among five members of the Central Secretariat according to individual expertise.
Today, as domestic and international affairs grow ever more complex, there is an increasing need for collaborative governance. For the Chinese top leadership, such collaboration manifests on multiple levels: firstly, most Politburo Standing Committee members have assistant roles to play apart from his major area of responsibility; secondly, Politburo members are each in charge of different policymaking organizations which exchange information on a regular basis, and brief the top leaders on matters of strategic importance; thirdly, a plethora of internal think tanks, in collaboration and competition with each other, form the brain of CPC central leadership, and serve as essential means to gather intelligence and advise on policies.
In the Western political context, while the separation of powers effectively prohibits ill usage of authority, it also produces political gridlocks and mutual detachments that prevent ambitious leaders from introducing much needed fundamental reforms. Whereas for China, top leaders and the respective organizations they represent not only facilitate but also supervise each other in a unified system, which gives rise to accountable governance and encourages leaders to do good.
COLLECTIVE POWER TRANSITION
Frequently dubbed as opaque by western media, leadership transition is one of the most misread modus operandi in Chinese politics. In nearly half a century’s time, China abolished personal appointment of heirs, and moved to a system of collectively selecting, evaluating, and grooming future leaders.
An important factor differentiating China from the West is that Chinese leaders compete on meritocratic basis alone, unlike their Western counterparts whose ascendance is dependent upon the merits of election campaigns rather than performance assessment. In electoral democracies, political parties literally represent various partial interests, and the right for any party to hold office is directly derived from winning periodical elections. In the case of the CPC’s, however, the Party is not meant to be “partial,” it represents the interest of the mass majority in society. Legitimacy for a CPC leader comes from performance and solid track record. It would be unthinkable to have an incompetent leader with scant experience in public affairs, such as the likes of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, running the government.
There are at least two major meritocratic thresholds that any mid-level CPC cadre must meet before they can move into the Party’s top echelon. First, they must have served at the level of provincial Party leader. In a way, these positions represent an elite training program for governance and public administration that few countries can offer. In a prolonged, competitive, and stringent process, capable candidates must tackle all kinds of regional / sectoral challenges. They need to keep themselves well informed and have various resources ready at their fingertips at all times. They need to be able to consistently demonstrate that they have what it takes to lead the world’s most populous country to an even better future. Put it bluntly, only the best and fittest survive, the rest would retire. For example, Meng Jianzhu, now a central government high-ranking Party official, began his career as a county Party Secretary and then Vice Mayor of Shanghai. Subsequently, he headed the provincial government and Party Committee of Jiangxi, a province in eastern China with over 45 million people and a GDP equivalent to that of Pakistan, before he was able to serve on the Central Committee of Political and Legislative Affairs.
Once a member of the Central Committee, a second threshold is for a potential future leader to demonstrate that he or she has the tenacity and commitment to make their way to the top. They need to serve as alternate members of Politburo Standing Committee for several years. In this preparatory phase, current leaders would put these candidates to tests, and screen the most competent and well disciplined for subsequent collective power transition.
Since the CPC is meant to be a guardian, if not the only guardian, of the overall interest of the Chinese people, the Party bears the ultimate responsibility for the betterment of the country, the nation, and the state. For obvious reasons, transition of such leadership must be handled with care. Such collective mechanism not only keeps potential dictators at bay, but also prevents the likes of Gorbachev from taking power in China and undoing China’s great achievements so far.
COLLECTIVE LEARNING
The CPC has a long tradition in collective learning, a multi-faceted practice that entails expert consulting, information-sharing, international exchange, and learning from best practices. Without exception, generations of Chinese leaders all called attention to continuous learning. In 2003, collective learning became a codified practice in the Second Plenum of 16th Central Committee.
The Politburo regularly and frequently organizes lectures, seminars, symposiums, where Standing Committee members would consult top Chinese minds on matters of economic and social importance. Through this mechanism, constructive interaction between various decision-making and policy-consulting bodies would help the central government take fitting actions on even the most delicate issues.
In my capacity as a professor at Tsinghua University, I teach high-level cadres customized courses on contemporary China studies and China’s reform. Such courses were first offered in Central Party School and Chinese Academy of Governance; top Chinese Universities soon followed. Today, collective learning has already become a highly institutionalized mechanism with broad participation.
To be sure, CPC officials learn far beyond from books and in classrooms, from their rotational career postings through different sectors, namely Party Committee, State-Owned Enterprises, and other social organizations. On average, the current members of Central Politburo Standing Committee each have 43.6 years of experience in civil service, and 38.9 years of Party membership. Born in 1953, President Xi Jinping, for instance, joined the civil service in 1969, and joined the CPC in 1974 - that adds up to more than four decades of learning and experience in public administration, organization and management.
COLLECTIVE RESEARCH
“He who carries out no research and investigation shouldn’t be entitled to his opinions”, said Mao Zedong in 1930.
Having adequate and relevant information is the foundation to any successful public policy making. This is particularly true for China, a country with vast territory and the world’s largest population. It is extremely unlikely that any individual would possess well-rounded and in-depth knowledge on all aspects of society. Therefore, no one, however capable, could act appropriately on such gross information deficit. In the case of Chinese collective presidency, each member of the Politburo Standing Committee stays well informed by a good number of subcommittees, internal research institutes and independent think-tanks in various fields. At the same time, they also conduct plenty primary research and investigations. Such effort not only strengthens local implementation of central government’s policies, but also provides preventive measures to deal with contingencies, such as natural disasters and social hazards.
Once an export-driven economy with complex domestic disparity, China was highly susceptible to external shocks from the international economic environment. It requires tremendous amount of knowledge and prudence to devise macro-level policies for the whole nation. When the latest financial crisis hit the world in 2008, while many governments were either gridlocked on the effective cause of action or taken by surprise due to internal unpreparedness. In China all nine members of the 17th Politburo Standing Committee promptly conducted field investigations and soon reached unanimous decision on the launch of a timely 4 trillion yuan stimulus package to boost the economy. This highly institutionalized collective decision-making process can effectively prepare China for any possible challenges that arise externally.
In the latest edition of China’s Collective Presidency, I attached a chronological record showing in detail that by the end of 2013, how President Xi spent nearly 10 percent of his time on 14 inspection trips that covered one third of China’s provinces and all seven military regions. Prior to the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee meeting of the CPC, topics such as rural land reform were most controversially debated. In order to have a better understanding on those key issues, in addition to official reports, Xi Jinping purposefully visited farmers in Hubei province and gathered firsthand information from the grassroots level.
COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING
After more than six decades of ups and downs, it is increasingly clear to Beijing that making the right strategic decision is the greatest success, and failing to do so would result in national calamity. In fact, China had learned its lessons from the chaotic late years of Mao -- If China had stood firmly against Mao’s personal leadership and held on to collective decision-making mechanism from 1958 to 1976, as it had during the civil war and in the first decade of communist rule, catastrophic movements such as the Cultural Revolution could have largely been prevented.
A common hindrance to efficient decision-making and good governance stems from the asymmetry of power. The loss and restoration of balance in China’s political power structure explain respectively Mao’s failure and Deng’s success. After seeing Mao’s grave mistakes, Deng Xiaoping openly stressed in 1980 that ‘important issues must be discussed collectively; each Party committee member should be entitled to one vote, and decision-making should strictly follow the rule of majority’.
Contrary to western stereotypical views on China’s democratic centralism, democratic procedures from information exchange to consensus seeking are in fact the backbones and lifeblood of the country’s collective decision-making.
With more than 85 million members, the Communist Party of China is the world’s largest ruling entity. It has seen the struggles and ambitions of earlier regimes, and explored on itself various institutional possibilities over the course of its history. China is a civilization with profound regional differences. Only collective presidency is able to capture such diverse interests of the Chinese people, and coordinate among different levels of the government to strike a balance between the Party and the state. It takes collective presidency to unify and mobilize social forces on all fronts, and continuously propel the nation forward.